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Abstract 
Typically the literature on trade policy in the presence of imperfect competition has derived 
optimal tariff and subsidy policies that maximize economic welfare. However, given that non-
tariff policies are more common forms of protection, this paper focusses on the derivation of 
optimal import quotas. Specifically, the impact of incomplete capture of quota rents by the home 
government is evaluated. The results indicate that as foreign finns are able to capture more rents, 
the optimal import quota should be made more restrictive. In the limit, where the home 
government captures no rents, a virtually prohibitive quota is optimal. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent developments in the international economics literature have focussed on the impact of 
imperfect competition in international markets. In particular, a theoretical rationale has been 
given for the use of protectionism or what have been termed strategic trade policies. The 
standard justification for such policies is that of "rent-shifting" (see, for example, Brander and 
Spencer, 1985, and Dixit, 1984). The basic idea is that a government can alter the nature of 
competition between firms for monopoly rents in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Typically, this literature has considered the role of tariffs and export subsidies as a means 
of increasing national welfare. However, observation would suggest that governments tend to 
use non-tariff restrictions such as import quotas. Such forms of protection have received 
somewhat less attention in the strategic trade policy literature, though the effects of quotas in a 
price-setting framework have been considered by Harris (1985) and Krishna (1989) and in a 
quantity-setting framework by Hwang and Mai (1988) and Fung (1989). 
In this paper, an expression for an optimal quota is derived and evaluated, using a 
theoretical framework originally suggested by Dixit (1988). In particular, it is shown that when 
quota rents are not fully captured by the home government, the optimal level of imports should 
be more restrictive. The relationship between the quota and level of rent capture is such that in 
the limit where the government captures no rents, a virtually prohibitive quota is shown to be 
optimal. Hence, by implication, observed voluntary export restraints are unlikely to be welfare 
maximizing. 
The paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2, a general conjectural variations model of 
oligopoly is outlined, drawing on a model originally suggested by Dixit, and in Section 3, this 
model is used to derive an expression for an optimal import quota that is equivalent to an optimal 
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import tariff. Section 4 considers the extent to which such an optimal quota would vary with the 
extent of rent capture by the home government. 
2. Theoretical Model 
The model of oligopoly used in this paper follows that of Dixit. A situation is considered where 
domestic firms compete with imports, the essential features of the model being the use of a 
general conjectural variations approach, where the conjectural variations parameters are left free, 
allowing different forms of oligopolistic behavior; finns' costs are assumed to be constant; home 
produced goods (subscript 1) and imported goods (subscript 2) are treated as imperfect 
substitutes. 
Focussing on the home market, consumer surplus is given by: 
(1) 
where the utility function f(Q1,Q2) is defined as: 
(2) 
From (1) and (2) the inverse demand functions for the home produced and imported goods 
can be derived: 
(3) 
(4) 
where all parameters are positive, b1b2-k2~0 since the products may be imperfect substitutes, p1 
and p2 are prices and Q1 and Q2 are quantities. 
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On the supply side, there are ni firms in the home and foreign economies. Profits for a 
representative firm in each country are given by: 
(5) 
(6) 
where prices and quantities are as defined above, ci and fi are marginal and fixed costs 
respectively and r is a rent per unit of import which is assumed to be captured by the home 
government through selling quota licenses. 
As noted earlier, the model is one where firms' reactions to one another are treated as a 
' 
Nash equilibrium with conjectural variations. The conjectural variations parameters are derived 
from the first-order conditions of the respective profits functions: 
(7) 
(8) 
where dp/dqi is the conjectural variations parameter, i.e. the firm's expectation of how market 
prices will vary with changes in its output. Therefore, if a representative firm plays Coumot, it 
believes rival firms will not change output in response to a change in qi, hence dp/d~=-bi, the 
slope of the inverse demand function. If the market were perfectly competitive, a change in one 
firm's output would have no effect on market price, i.e. 
dp/dqi =O. 
Aggregating over the ni finns generates: 
(9) P1 - ct - Q1 V1 "' 0 
(10) 
where Vi is the aggregate conjectural variations parameter. Thus, for Cournot behavior, 
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Vi=-b/ni and as ni increases, the more competitive the Cournot outcome becomes. In the limit 
Vi=O, i.e. petfect competition. 
Finally, equilibrium prices and quantities in the model are obtained by combining (3) and 
(4}with (9) and (10), the explicit solutions for prices and quantities being: 
(11) 
(12) 
3. Optimal Import Quotas 
The home government's objective is to choose a policy to maximize national welfare1, which 
is the sum of consumer surplus f', domestic finns' profits and government revenue as given by: 
(13) 
where r is the per unit quota rent, and a. is a parameter indicating the level of rent capture by the 
government, i.e. for a system of import licences that captures all the quota rents, a.=1, while for 
a voluntary export restraint, a.=0. 
Substituting in for f' from (1), (13) can be re-written as: 
(14) 
For present purposes, the optimal quota is defined along the lines traditionally followed 
in the international trade literature regarding the equivalence between tariffs and quotas from 
Shibata (1968) onwards, i.e. the (optimal) quota is the level of imports that would be generated 
1 As Dixit has shown, in a full optimum policies are targeted at both the domestic and foreign market distortions. 
Here the focus is on the trade distortion alone, what Dixit has called the constrained optimum, where the trade 
instrument partially counters the domestic distortion. 
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by the (optimal) tariff. Hence, in Figure 1, a tariff t would lead to the import level cd as 
compared to free trade imports of ab, hence the quota-equivalent of the tariff would be ed. In 
addition, if the per unit tariff t is treated as optimal, it implies an optimal per unit quota rent of 
r, assuming complete capture of the rents by the domestic government through a system of import 
licences, i.e. cx.=1. 
Figure 1 
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Therefore, in terms of the model outlined above, the optimal per unit quota rent is derived 
by maximizing expression (13) with respect tor. Using (2), (10), (11) and (12), the first-order 
condition for maximization is: 
(15) k(a1 - c1)(V1 P2 - V2 P1) + (tli - c2 )(V2 P~ - k2 V1) r = -----------"-----='---_::_ __ ____:._ P~(a P2 + V2) - k2 (a P1 + V1) 
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This expression is similar to that derived by Dixit for an optimal per unit tariff, except that the 
parameter ex. appears in the denominator, which accounts fo! the extent of rent capture by the 
home government. 
The optimal quota-equivalent of the tariff/quota rent is derived by substituting expression 
(15) into (11): 
(16) 
which after re-arranging, gives the following expression for the quota Q2: 
(17) Q =!!_(IL_ c >[l _ VzP~ - k2V1]- _!_(a _ c >[l + P1CV1P2 - V2P1>] 
2 11' -z 2 £ 11' 1 1 £ 
So from (16) and (17), the following proposition can be established. 
Proposition 1. If cx.=l, and given values for ~. bi and k, the optimal quota-equivalent of the 
tariff/quota rent can be derived from the government's welfare maximizing problem, and can be 
shown to vary negatively in the level of the optimal quota rent, positively and negatively in the 
costs of home and foreign firms respectively, and inversely in their conjectural variations. 
It should be noted here that tariffs and import quotas are deemed to be equivalent if the 
domestic prices of the good are identical following the imposition of the policy. Much of the 
literature on the non-equivalence between these trade policies has considered the polar cases of 
monopoly and perfect competition (see Helpman and Krugman, 1989). However, in the present 
context, the effects of quota restrictions will have an additional effect of changing the conjectures 
of firms competing in the market. Essentially, the domestic finn will know the response.of its 
competitor as the foreign firm's reaction function will be kinked where the quota is binding. On 
.. 
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this issue, Hwang and Mai have shown that if the home firm's conjectures were more (less) 
competitive than Cournot, the effect of the quota is to raise (lower) domestic prices, relative to 
those that would have prevailed in the presence of tariffs. 
Since, following the imposition of the quota, the home firms act in a Cournot-manner (i.e. 
they know that there will be no response from their foreign competitors) and that the foreign 
firms' conjecture is undefined where the quota is binding (i.e. V2=0), the effect of the import 
quota on Q1 is given as: 
(18) 
which is derived from (11), where V~ is the Cournot-equivalent conjecture for the domestit firms. 
From (18), the following proposition is derived. 
Proposition 2. The equilibrium level of the domestic firms' output will vary positively in the 
optimal per unit rent and hence negatively in the output restriction imposed on the foreign finns. 
4. Incomplete Capture of Quota Rents 
In deriving Propositions 1 and 2, it was assumed that the government completely captures the 
rents from imposing an optimal quota, i.e. cx=l. However, there is often incomplete capture of 
quota rents, either because of low import licence fees or because of the use of voluntary export 
restraints, whereby no quota rents are captured by the domestic government. Hence, the interest 
is in evaluating the optimal quota when ex is less than 1. 
It is easiest to initially consider this problem in terms of the optimal quota rent expression 
(16). This is simplified in the following manner: 
.. 
.. 
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Let l. = (al - C1)k( P2 vl - P1 Vz) + (D:z - Cz)( P! Vz - k2 Vl) 
and Y1 = <P!P2 - P1k2); Y2 = <P!V2 - k2 V1) 
l. 
r=---
"Y1 + Y2 
In order to define the relationship between r and a., the first and second-order derivatives 
of (19) with respect to a. are evaluated: 
(20) 
(21) 
a. is positive by definition, and if the optimal quota rent r is positive, then A., y1 and y2 
are also positive, hence the first and second order derivatives will be negative and positive 
respectively. In other words, the relationship between the optimal quota rent and the level of rent 
capture a. is quasi-hyperbolic. 
Substituting (19) into (11), the relationship between the optimal quota and level of rent 
capture can be derived and evaluated: 
(22) 
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Taking the first and second-order derivatives of (22) with respect to a: 
(23) 
(24) z-6 Oz= -2at-1p1A.(uy1 + 12r'1~ < O if u,A.,11 and Yz > O 
6u2 
Again, a is positive by definition and A., y1 and y2 are positive if the optimal quota rent is 
positive. Therefore, the following proposition can be stated. 
Proposition 3. The level of the optimal quota Q2 is a positive but diminishing function of the 
level of quota rent capture a. In the limit as a approaches zero, i.e. a voluntary export restraint 
is implemented by the home government, a virtually prohibitive quota will be optimal (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
0 1 a 
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To complete the analysis, the effect of incomplete capture of quota rents on the 
equilibrium level of home firms' output can be derived by substituting (19) into (18) and 
differentiating with respect to a.: 
(25) 
(26) 
Given the correct signs on the parameters, the following proposition can be stated. 
Proposition 4. The equilibrium level of the domestic firms' output will vary negatively in the 
level of quota rent capture a.. 
5. Summary 
This paper has considered the effects of import quotas in oligopolistic markets. Given a general 
conjectural variations model of oligopoly, an expression for the quota-equivalent of an optimal 
tariff can be derived. Critically, it has been shown that the optimal level of the quota will be 
more restrictive the more incomplete is the level of rent capture by the domestic government. 
By implication, when a voluntary export restraint is used, a very restrictive level of imports is 
optimal. 
• , 
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